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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
SONNY GARCIA, 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree 
felony, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent 
to Distribute, a third degree felony in violation of Section 58-
37-8 (1) (iv) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Section 58-37a-5 (1) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in finding that the magistrate had 
probable cause to issue the search warrant? The duty of the 
reviewing court is to ensure that the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. 
Because this court, like the reviewing court below, is bound by 
the contents of the affidavit, it need not defer to the trial 
court's finding, but rather, makes an independent review of the 
CASE NO. 920531-CA 
Priority 2 
trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written 
evidence. However, in reviewing the magistrate's determination 
of the sufficiency of the affidavit, this court is obliged to pay 
great deference to the finding of probable cause and does not 
make a de novo review. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 83 0 (Utah App. 
1991) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Amendment IV, Constitution of the United States 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-3, 1953 as amended 
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 (1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly 
describing the person or place to be searched and the 
person, property or evidence to be seized." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 27, 1991, defendant, Sonny Garcia and co-defendant 
Elizabeth Anderson, were charged by information with Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony in violation of Section 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) 
2 
U.C.A. as amended, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony in violation of 
Section 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) U.C.A. 1953, as amended and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Section 58-37a-5 (1) U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
On June 10, 1991, following preliminary hearing and bindover 
to the First Judicial District Court, defendant filed a Motion to 
Supress, which was denied. Defendant filed an interlocutory 
appeal of that decision which was denied on February 19, 1992. 
During the course of pre-trial proceedings, defendant absconded 
from the jurisdiction of the Court and has not yet been located. 
On July 16, 1992, defendant was tried in absentia and convicted 
by a jury on all counts. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 27, 1991, First Judicial Circuit Court Judge 
Clint Judkins issued a search warrant authorizing search of Room 
#211, at the Days Inn Motel in Logan, Utah, at anytime of the day 
or night. The warrant was issued based upon a supporting 
affidavit, a copy of which is attached as Addendum A, which 
contained the following information: 
a. On January 29, 1991, investigating officers received 
information from an anonymous source that Elizabeth Anderson and 
an individual known as "Sonny" were transporting marijuana from 
Arizona to Utah and were distributing it in Cache Valley. The 
anonymous source indicated that the two individuals were residing 
at the Days Inn Motel in Logan, Utah. The affidavit does not 
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indicate whether the confidential informant is an ordinary 
citizen or a police informant. The affidavit does not indicate 
the basis of knowledge of the informant, nor does it supply any 
information with regard to the reliability or veracity of said 
informant. In short, no information is provided regarding the 
informant. 
b. Officers commenced an investigation based upon this tip 
and determined the following: 
A 1987 blue Buick located at the Days Inn parking lot 
was registered to Elizabeth Anderson. 
On December 24, 1991, Elizabeth Anderson rented Room 
211 at the Days Inn and paid approximately $1500 in cash for the 
room since that date. A male hispanic occupied the room with Ms. 
Anderson. These two individuals were occasionally absent from 
the motel for three to four days at a time. 
A subpoena duces tecum obtained by officers for the 
outgoing phone calls made from Room #211 at the Day's Inn were 
traced to an unlisted phone number in Tucson, Arizona. The 
affidavit does not indicate whether the investigating officers 
were able to identify to whom the phone number was assigned. 
During five days of surveillance which occurred two days 
prior to application for the search warrant, officers observed 
Elizabeth Anderson leaving Room #211 alone and driving away in 
the 1987 blue Buick, observed Elizabeth Anderson leaving Room 
#211 with used linen, towels and garbage and meeting the motel 
maid outside the room to receive fresh towels and linen. Officers 
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did not observe an hispanic male at the residence during that 
time. 
Four days prior to application for the search warrant, 
Elizabeth Anderson commented to the motel manager that she was 
concerned that her boyfriend may have had car trouble as she had 
not heard from him. 
Officers traced one phone call from Elizabeth Anderson to 
her mother's home in Hyrum, Utah, the registered address of the 
1987 blue Buick. Officers found a letter from Elizabeth Anderson 
to her son in trash which had been placed on curbside for pickup 
at this same location. The letter mentioned a "Sonny" and stated 
that "we will be there soon". The letter also mentioned that 
Elizabeth was dissatisfied with her job and that she was trying 
to find a different job. The letter was postmarked from Phoenix, 
Arizona, but had as a return address, Elizabeth's mother's 
residence in Hyrum, Utah. The affidavit does not disclose the 
date the officer found the letter, nor the date of the letter or 
the postmark. The letter had in fact been postmarked December , 
1990. 
A criminal history check of Elizabeth Anderson showed two 
prior narcotic arrests. The affidavit indicated that Ms. 
Anderson had been arrested in 1987 for possession of a controlled 
substance and in 1983, for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute and possession of marijuana. It was determined at the 
suppression hearing that the dates of Ms. Anderson's previous 
arrests were actually 1977 and 1983. The affidavit did not 
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disclose the ultimate disposition of those arrests. Both cases 
had in fact been dismissed. 
Cache County Sheriff, Sid Groll, arrested Ms. Anderson in 
1983 and stated that during his investigation he had received 
information that Ms. Anderson was a large supplier of narcotics 
in the Cache County Area. This information was at least eight 
years old at the time officers applied for this search warrant. 
The affidavit, however, does not indicate that the information 
supplied by Sid Groll was based upon information received eight 
years earlier. 
On February 26, 1991, the day prior to the issuance of the 
search warrant, officers observed a male hispanic, approximately 
35 years of age, residing with Ms. Anderson. On that same date, 
officers observed a white female enter Room 211 at the Day's Inn 
and exit approximately one minute later. This female left the 
Days Inn parking lot and was followed to two different locations. 
At each of these locations she knocked, went inside, exited after 
only a few minutes and left. Officers then lost surveillance of 
that individual. 
Based on the allegations contained in the affidavit, a 
search warrant was issued on February 27, 1991. Pursuant to the 
search warrant, officers seized marijuana, white pills and other 
contraband. 
On February 27, 1991, shortly after execution of the first 
warrant, officers obtained a second warrant to search a storage 
unit and the 1987 blue Buick. The grounds for the second search 
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warrant were based on items and information obtained by officers 
in executing the first search warrant. 
A Motion to Supress was filed by defense counsel on June 10, 
1991. Said Motion was denied by the First Judicial District 
Court Judge on December 31, 1991. Counsel for the defendants 
filed an interlocutory appeal which was denied by the Appellate 
Court on February 19, 1992. 
On June 25, 1992, Defendant was convicted of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The affidavit used to support issuance of the search warrant 
was deficient in a number of respects. First, the affidavit 
relies, in part, upon the conclusory tip of an anonymous 
informant, for whom there is no independent showing of veracity, 
reliability or basis of knowledge. Accordingly, the affidavit 
failed under the earlier Aquilar-Spinelli standards and defendant 
requests this Court to hold that those standards apply to an 
analysis under Article 1, section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
Corroborating information obtained by independent police 
investigation confirmed, in part, the anonymous informant's tip. 
However, the information failed to establish with a fair 
probability that contraband would be discovered in the particular 
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location and on the particular date recited in the search 
warrant. Further, the affidavit contained false and misleading 
statements, which when removed further erode the finding of 
probable cause. 
ARGUMENT 1: THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 77-23-3 OF THE 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
The Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14, guarantees the 
citizens of the State of Utah freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized.1' 
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-3, 1953 as amended 
likewise states: 
"(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing 
the person or place to be searched and the person, property or 
evidence to be seized." 
The interpretation of the protections provided by these 
provisions has historically been based upon the interpretation 
given by the United States Supreme Court to the similar provision 
contained in the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution: 
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"Article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads nearly 
verbatim with the fourth amendment, and thus this Court has never 
drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded by the 
respective constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court has 
always considered the protections afforded to be one and the 
same." 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) 
However, the Supreme Court of Utah, in State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990) has indicated it's willingness to 
diverge from United States's Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the fourth amendment in the appropriate case: 
'In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), this court 
explained that because of the similarity between article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment of 
the United States Constitution, we have not in the past drawn any 
distinctions between the protections respectively afforded by 
them. Id. at 1221. We then noted, however, that "we have by no 
means ruled out the possibility of doing so in some future case" 
since " choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat 
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the 
federal courts.Id. at n. 8."' 
Although the Larocco case dealt with an automobile search, 
the Court of Appeals has on several occasions left open the 
possibility that, in the appropriate case, an independent state 
constitutional analysis could be applied to challenge the 
sufficiency of an affidavit used to support issuance of a search 
warrant. See e.g., State v. Buford, 82 0 P.2d 13 81 (Utah App. 
1991) and State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the instant case, defendant briefed and argued the State 
Constitutional analysis at the trial court level. See 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress. 
Further, First District Court Judge Low held that the affidavit 
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failed under the Acruilar-Spinelli standard. Accordingly, this 
Court is presented with the opportunity to decide whether the 
Utah Constitution provides protections which are more expansive 
than the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution in 
the context of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued, 
in part, on information provided by an anonymous source. 
Under Aquilar-Spinelli, affidavits based on informants' tips 
must set out underlying circumstances sufficient to (1) reveal 
the basis of an informant's knowledge, and (2) establish the 
veracity of the informant or, alternatively, the reliability of 
his report in a particular case. See Aguilar v. Texas,378 U.S. 
108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 21 L.Ed. 637 (1969). 
Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) points out the 
significance and benefit of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards: 
"Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 
723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 
584, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1969), infuse the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement with vitality by requiring that an affidavit in 
support of an application for a warrant reveal that there is a 
reasonably reliable basis in fact for a finding of probable cause 
to support issuance of a warrant. This requirement is the only 
real protection that citizens have against an agent of the state 
intruding on the privacy of their homes and effects on only the 
slightest pretext, or even no pretext at all. The basis of the 
affiant's knowledge must be set forth in the affidavit together 
with some evidence supporting the veracity of the informant when 
the affidavit includes allegations of a confidential informant. 
Without such a foundation, a warrant becomes a mere charade, and 
the basic liberty protected by the Fourth Amendment would 
constitute an unenforceable right, or, more realistically stated, 
no right at all." 
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Illinois v. 
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Gates, 462 US 213, 76 L Ed 2d 527, 103 S Ct 2317, indicates that 
it was unnecessary for the United States Supreme Court to 
overturn Acruilar-Spinelli, as the standards established in those 
cases, provided that an informant's tip which was in and of 
itself insufficient to establish probable cause, might yet be 
used to establish probable cause, and further expresses concern 
over the possible erosion of the probable cause standard: 
"As shown above, it is not at all necessary to overrule 
Aguilar-Spinelli in order to reverse the judgment below. 
Therefore, because I am inclined to believe that, when applied 
properly, the Aguilar-Spinelli rules play an appropriate role in 
probable-cause determinations, and because the Court's holding 
may foretell an evisceration of the probable-cause standard, I do 
not join the Court's holding." 
Id. at 570. 
The Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Jackson, 688 
P.2d 136 (Wash 1984), explains and supports its decision not to 
"...follow, blindly, the lead of the United State Supreme 
Court.." in rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli standards: 
"The Gates totality of the circumstances approach lacks 
sufficient specificity and analytical structure to adequately 
inform magistrates as to the appropriate standards required to 
protect the right of privacy secured by Const, art. 1, Section 7. 
Thus, we decline the State's invitation to follow the United 
States Supreme Court's lead in abandoning well-established 
protections against unreasonable searches." Id. at 143. 
Under the facts of this case, the information supplied by 
the confidential informant failed to establish the credibility or 
basis of knowledge of the informant. The affidavit merely states 
that tlOn or about January 29, 1991, information was received from 
an anonymous source that Elizabeth Anderson and her boyfriend, 
only known by "Sonny" are transporting marijuana from Arizona to 
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Utah and distributing it in Cache Valley. They are currently 
residing at the Day's Inn Motel in Logan Utah." The affidavit 
provides no information as to the status of the informant, the 
basis of knowledge of the informant or the reliability of the 
informant. Further, although some of the statements of the 
anonymous informant were corroborated by police, there is still 
insufficient information, under the Acruilar-Spinelli standard, 
to establish the informant's basis of knowledge or to ensure 
informant's credibility, reliability or veracity. First District 
Court Judge Gordon Low acknowledges this fact in his memorandum 
decision, attached hereto as Addendum B: 
"There is little question that under the older "two-pronged" 
test enunciated in Spennille vs. United States, (sic) 393 U.S. 
210, (1969) and Augilar vs. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the 
affidavit is deficient. The "two-pronged" test requires: 1, 
revealing of the informant's "basis of knowledge" and 2. 
providing of sufficient facts to establish the informant's 
"veracity" or "reliability". Nothing in the affidavit reveals 
anything about either except that he or she is anonymous. Wlr 
anonymity, what relationship existed between the information c-.id 
the defendant, whether there was observation, involvement, or 
rumor or what ever that formed the basis of the knowledge is 
absent. Nor is any information furnished by the officer directly 
relating to the informant's "reliability or veracity". 
Under Acruilar and Spennillie supra (sic) our inquiry would 
stop there, the affidavit would fail, and the evidence would be 
suppressed." 
Memorandum of Gordon R. Low, Page 2. 
Defendant urges the Court to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli 
standards to the Utah Constitution and to suppress the evidence 
seized. 
ARGUMENT 2. THE AFFIDAVIT FAILS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE 
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
"Before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must 
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review an affidavit containing specific facts sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause." State v Purser 828 P.2d 
515 (Utah 1992), ritina State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 
1989). The magistrate must not merely ratify the bare 
conclusions of others. Id. at 517, citing, Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1983) 
remaining citations omitted. "The magistrate's task is to decide 
"whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place." Id. at 517, remaining citations omitted. 
Upon appellate review, this Court must examine the search warrant 
affidavit "in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion," State 
v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985). Factors to 
consider in determining whether probable cause exists include an 
informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. See, 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 
798 P. 2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990) 
State v. Purser, supra, at 517, details the factors which 
should be considered in making a determination as to whether an 
affidavit contains sufficient information to support a finding of 
probable cause: 
In some cases, the circumstances may require the supporting 
affidavit to set forth in detail the basis of knowledge, veracity 
and reliability of a person supplying information in order to 
establish probable cause. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 
(Utah 1984) . In other cases, if the circumstances as a whole 
demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less 
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strong showing is required. Id. at 1205-6. For example, 
reliability and veracity are generally assumed when the informant 
is a citizen who receives nothing from the police in exchange for 
the information. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P. 2d 
at 287; State v.Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah App. 1989), 
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Courts have also 
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where an 
informants's knowledge is based on personal observation. See 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287; Stromberq, 783 
P. 2d at 57. Further buttressing reliability is the detail with 
which the informant describes the facts set forth in the 
affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts 
See Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102; Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 
798 P.2d at 287." 
In the instant case, there is no information on the status 
of the informant. We do not know whether the informant is a 
citizen or police informant. Accordingly, the reliability of the 
informant is not assumed. Further, the informant did not provide 
information which was based upon personal observation. 
Accordingly, the information is not inherently reliable. 
Finally, the informant provided very little detail in describing 
facts set forth in the affidavit. On the contrary, the 
informant's statements are conclusory and general in nature. The 
informant provides no information describing the 'basis of his or 
her knowledge'. In this case, we do not know how or where the 
informant obtained his or her information. Therefore, the basis 
of knowledge under the 'totality-of-circumstances' has not been 
met. The affidavit does not indicate whether the informant had 
previously been reliable. Therefore, the reliability aspect of 
the 'totality of circumstances' test has not been met. 
The only way to establish the reliability, veracity and 
basis of knowledge of this informant is to establish whether 
police independently corroborated facts which were sufficient to 
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overcome the above-described deficiencies and which establish 
"fair probability that the evidence sought actually exists and 
can be found where the informant so states." State v. Anderson 
701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985) 
Police confirmed that a blue Buick located at the Day's Inn 
parking lot was registered to Elizabeth Anderson. The hotel 
management confirmed that a Liz Anderson had rented a room at the 
Day's Inn Motel since December 24, 1990. Hotel management also 
confirmed that a male hispanic was living in the room with Ms. 
Anderson. The police thus verified that Elizabeth Anderson and a 
male hispanic were residing at the Days Inn Motel. However: 
"Corroboration of public or innocuous facts only shows that 
the informer has some familiarity with the suspect's 
affairs. Such corroboration only justifies an inference 
that the informer has some knowledge of the suspect and his 
activities, not that criminal activity is occurring. 
Corroboration of the informer's report is significant only 
to the extent that it tends to give substance and verity to 
the report that the suspect is engaged in criminal 
activity." 
State v.Jackson, supra, at 140. 
The second aspect of the informant's information was that 
the Elizabeth Anderson and her boyfriend were involved in 
transporting drugs from Arizona to Cache Valley and distributing 
them in the Cache Valley area. The police point to the following 
information as corroborating that statement: 
1. Elizabeth Anderson paid for her room in cash. She did 
not appear to have employment in the area. She mailed a letter 
to her son from Arizona but used her mother's Hyrum address as 
the return address. On more than one occasion, Ms. Anderson met 
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the motel maid outside of her room to receive fresh linens and to 
return her used linens. 
2. A subpoena duces tecum was obtained for outgoing phone 
calls made from room #211 at the Day's Inn in Logan. Several 
phone calls were traced to an unlisted phone number in Tucson, 
Arizona. 
3. A criminal history check revealed, according to the 
affidavit, that Ms. Anderson had a previous narcotics arrest in 
1983 and 1987. (This information was inaccurate and will be 
discussed below) Sid Groll, Cache county Sheriff, indicated that 
when he investigated Ms. Anderson ten years earlier, "he had 
received information that Elizabeth Anderson was a large supplier 
of drugs in the Cache County area." 
4. Surveillance on February 26, 1991 revealed a male 
hispanic was residing with Elizabeth Anderson. On that same 
date, police observed a female enter the room and leave 
approximately 1 minute later. The female then went to two other 
Logan residences entered for a few minutes and left. 
The difficulty with the information provided by the 
informant and the independent police investigation is that it is 
as consistent with innocent as with criminal conduct and does not 
indicate with fair probability that controlled substances either 
exist or can be located at the Day's Inn Motel on the date and at 
the time of issuance of the search warrant. No one has seen 
controlled substances at this location, there is no indication 
that either police or the confidential informant ever observed 
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either of the defendant's with controlled substances at any time. 
From the date of the informant's tip on January 29, 1991 to the 
date of issuance of the search warrant on February 27, 1991, only 
one individual was seen entering and leaving Room #211 after 
being there for only a short period of time. The individual who 
entered the Motel was never stopped, investigated or searched so 
as to discover whether she had in fact purchased controlled 
substances from the defendant. In fact, the appearance of this 
one individual is the sole indication that drugs may have been 
distributed from that location. There is no indication that 
defendant's boyfriend was making a 'drug run' so as to establish 
that drugs would be found at the Days Inn on the date the warrant 
was executed. 
In State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989), the 
Garfield County Sheriff received information that methamphetamine 
was to be delivered to a residence in Panguitch, Utah on April 
28, 1987, between 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. As in the instant 
case, the affidavit was totally lacking in any information on the 
reliability, veracity or basis of knowledge of the confidential 
informant. The State nonetheless argued that the sheriff 
corroborated sufficient additional information prior to execution 
of the warrant to establish probable cause. The Court denied the 
State's argument stating that: 
"Partial corroboration of this deficient information does 
not transform the underlying facts and circumstances into 
probable cause. Without the requisite probable cause, grounds 
for a warrantless vehicle search under the Carroll doctrine were 
never established." Droneburq at 1306. 
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In other cases in which the Utah Appellate Courts have 
upheld the sufficiency of an affidavit used to support issuance 
of a search warrant, the affidavits have contained far more 
information than existed in the present case: 
In State v Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the 
informant personally observed the marijuana at the location where 
the search was ultimately conducted. In the present case, 
neither the informant nor the investigating officers ever 
observed contraband of any kind. 
In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1983), the 
informant had previously provided reliable information, the same 
information had been received independently by a second officer 
and from another informant who had previously provided reliable 
information, the information provided by the informant was 
detailed and officers verified significant facts. In the present 
case, there is no information regarding informant's prior 
reliability and the tip itself was conclusory and general in 
nature. 
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the informant 
previously provided reliable information and personally observed 
large quantities of marijuana being sold in smaller quantities at 
the defendant's residence five days prior to issuance of the 
search warrant. The Supreme Court pointed out that this 
information was not "...some remote hearsay or assumption based 
upon circumstantial evidence." Hansen at 130. In the present 
case, the information in the affidavit is based, in significant 
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measure, upon hearsay and circumstantial evidence. 
In State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah App. 1989), the 
informant personally observed marijuana and marijuana 
paraphernalia in defendant's home on numerous occasions and the 
informant was a "citizen informant" whose veracity is assumed. 
In the instant case, the status of the informant is unknown. 
In State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990), a citizen 
informant identified himself to Crime Solvers, personally 
observed marijuana in possession of children, gave a detailed 
description of the greenhouse and houses where the marijuana was 
alleged to have been located and police independently observed 
what appeared to be marijuana at the location described by the 
defendant. 
In State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515 (Utah App. 1992), the 
informant's information was based upon personal observation, the 
informant assisted law enforcement officers in performing two 
drug buys from defendant's home within ten days prior to the 
filing of the affidavit, the information was detailed and was 
independently corroborated by police officers and police observed 
numerous persons entering defendant's home and leaving shortly 
thereafter. 
In sum, although the corroborated information in the instant 
case may have lead police to suspect the defendants of drug 
distribution, those suspicions were insufficient to establish a 
fair probability that controlled substances would be found in 
Room #211 at the Days Inn Motel on the date and at the time the 
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warrant was executed. 
ARGUMENT 3. THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT IS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT 
CONTAINS FALSE AND MISLEADING INFORMATION REGARDING DEFENDANTS 
CRIMINAL HISTORY 
The affidavit used to support issuance of the first and 
second search warrants herein, represented that Elizabeth 
Anderson had two prior narcotics arrests in 1987 and 1983. In 
fact, the defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance in 1977, fourteen years prior to issuance of the search 
warrant. The affidavit is silent regarding the fact that both 
charges were ultimately dismissed. Judge Low held in his 
Memorandum decision, attached hereto as Addendum -- that: 
"There is no question that the 1987 date as found in 
paragraph 3(e) on the affidavit was erroneous and should have 
been correctly typed 1977." 
"If the defendant claims intentional misstatements or 
omissions or reckless disregard for the truth in the affidavit, a 
hearing must be held. If the court agrees with the defendant's 
characterization, the court must then determine whether probable 
cause exists after excising such misstatements." State v.Buford, 
820 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991) at 1385, citing, Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684-85, 57 
L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) . 
If the erroneous portion of this affidavit is removed, the 
reviewing Court is left with information that Elizabeth Anderson 
had a prior narcotics arrest, nine and fourteen years prior to 
application for the warrant:. While that information can be 
considered under the totality of the circumstances, certainly, it 
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can not be accorded great weight in determining the probability 
that defendant is currently in possession of or distributing 
controlled substances. 
ARGUMENT 3. THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT IS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT 
CONTAINS STALE INFORMATION 
Police claim they corroborated the informant's statement 
that defendant's were transporting drugs from Arizona, in part, 
by referencing a letter written by Elizabeth Anderson to her son 
which contained an Arizona postmark. However, the letter was 
postmarked November 23, 1990, some three months prior to 
execution of the search warrant. Further, the date of the 
postmark was not included in the affidavit itself. 
Additionally, the information provided in paragraph 3(e) of 
the affidavit indicates that Cache County Sheriff, Sid Groll, 
investigated Elizabeth Anderson in 1983 and "received 
information" that she was a "large supplier of narcotics in the 
Cache County area." This information is approximately eight 
years old. Further, there is no information regarding the source 
of Sheriff Groll's information, nor is there information 
regarding the reliability and basis of knowledge of the 
individual provided that information to the sheriff. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the decision of the trial court, suppress the 
evidence seized as a result of issuance of this warrant and grant 
defendant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1993. 
Barbara King L^phmar 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
above and foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee, Jan Graham, 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 





FIRST CIRCUIT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Logan, UT 84321 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No, 
I, Greg Ridler, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That Affiant is an Investigator with the Logan City Police 
Department. That Affiant has been with the Police 
Department for over 7 years, and is currently assigned to 
the Investigation Division and the Tri-County Narcotic 
Strike Force, Affiant's training and responsibility is to 
investigate all types of narcotic offenses. 
2. That Affiant investigated alleged offense of Distribution of 
a Controlled Substance. This investigation was assisted in 
by Det. Dennis Simonson who has over 20 years experience as 
a police officer and is currently assigned to the Tri-County 
Narcotics Strike Force and has received training in the area 
of narcotic offenses and surveillance. 
3. The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
a. On or about January 29, 1991, information was received 
from an anonymous source that EJizabeth Andersen and 
her boyfriend, only known by ,fSonny" are transporting 
marijuana from Arizona to Utah and distributing it in 
Cache Valley. They are currently residing at the Dayfs 
Inn Motel in Logan Utah. 
A 1987 blue Buick was located at the Day's Inn parking 
lot with a Utah's license plate of 980DFC. A records 
check showed the name of Elizabeth Andersen of 238 East 
Main in Hyrum as the registered owner. Hotel 
management confirmed that a Liz Andersen had rented 
room #211 at the Day's Inn in Logan, Utah. According 
to the management, Elizabeth Andersen has rented the 
room since December 24, 1990 and has paid a bill for 
approximately $1,500.00 in cash for the use of the 
room. Also a male hispanic has occupied the room with 
Elizabeth Anderson. Motel management reports that the 
male has never signed for the room or provided any 
information to identify him. Hotel management also 
reports that on occasion the occupants have been absent 
for 3 - 4 days at a time, even though the room has been 
paid for. /A subpoena duces tecum has been attained for 
the outgoing phone calls made from room #211 at the 
Day's Inn in Logan. Several phone calls were traced to 
an unlisted phone number in Tucson, Arizona. 
Surveillance was set up on room #211 by Det. Dennis 
Simonson. From February 20, 1991 to February 25, 1991 
no male hispanic was observed at the room. On 
occasion Elizabeth Andersen would leave the room and 
drive away by herself in the 1987 blue Buick. 
Elizabeth Andersen was also observed leaving her room 
with used linen, towels and garbage and meeting the 
motel maid outside the room and receiving fresh towels 
and linen, thus preventing the maid from entering the 
room. According to the motel managment, this has 
happened on several other occasions. On February 23, 
1991 Elizabeth Andersen commented to the motel manager 
that she was worried about her boyfriend that he might 
have had car trouble and that she had not heard from 
him. During the time of surveillance, it did not 
appear that Elizabeth Andersen had employment in the 
area and would only leave the motel to perform minor 
errands or to visit friends. 
Another phone call made from the motel was to an Alma 
Clark-Millard of 238 East Main in Hyrum, Utah, the same 
address on the Buick' s registration. Alma Clark-
Millard has been identified as Elizabeth Andersen's 
mother. Det. Simonson received Mrs. Millard's trash 
after having been placed on the curbside for for 
pickup. Among the items found in the trash was a 
letter addressed to a Steven James Andersen of 238 
East Main in Hyrum, Utah. The letter was written by 
Elizabeth Andersen to Steven, who is her son. The 
letter mentioned a ,fSonny" and states that "we be there 
soon". The letter also mentions they are trying to 
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find a different job, wishing she had never taken this 
job. The letter has the same return address as it is 
addressed to, 238 East Main, Hyrum, Utah, but has a 
Phoenix, Arizona postmark. 
e. A criminal history check on Elizabeth Andersen shows 
two prior narcotic arrests. In 1987 she was arrested 
for possession of a controlled substance and in 1983 
was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute and possession of marijuana. Current Cache 
County Sheriff, Sid Groll, who arrested Elizabeth 
Andersen in 1983, states that during his investigation 
he had received information that Elizabeth Andersen was 
a large supplier of narcotics in the Cache County area. 
f. Surveillance on February 26, 1991 revealed a male 
hispanic approximately 35 years of age, black hair, 
moustache, now residing in room #211 with Elizabeth 
Andersen. Elizabeth Andersen spoke to the hotel clerkm 
and indicated that her boyfriend had returned. Also on 
February 26, 1991 a vehicle driven by a white female 
was observed to go up to room #211. The female knocked 
and was admitted to the room. The female left 
approximately 1 minute later and exited the motel 
parking lot in her vehicle. The female was then 
followed to two different Logan residences where she 
knocked, went inside and came out after only a few 
minutes and left. After the second residence, an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to follow her further. 
4. Affiant has reason to believe, based on the above 
information and over a combined 27 years of experience and 
training between Det. Simonson and Ridler, that the persons 
known as Elizabeth Andersen and "Sonny" are involved in the 
distribution of controlled substances. The anonymous 
information is supported by the facts that Elizabeth 
Andersen is staying at the Day's Inn with a boyfriend by the 
name of "Sonny" who has Arizona connections. A large 
amount of cash was paid for the motel room by Elizabeth 
Andersen who also lists a local Hyrum residence. No 
evidence can be found of Elizabeth Andersen's employment and 
her boyfriend is believed to have been out of town over the 
last several days. Elizabeth Andersen continually refuses 
entry to the hotel maid, and a letter addressed by Elizabeth 
to her son in Hyrum intentionally had the return address 
deleted. Both of these actions are abanormally secretive. 
Upon return of the male hispanic, believed to be "Sonny", a 
female visited the room and was observed to act in a way 
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consistent with narcotic deliveries. With this information 
that in room #211 and in a 1987 blue Buick, Utah plate 
980DFC, there is now certain 
property described as: 
Marijuana material, other controlled substances, tools, 
devices, instruments or written documents pertaining to 
or related to the use of, possession of, controlled 
substances which is prohibited by the Utah Controlled 
Substance Act. ' Also dominion and control papers, 
effects, keys., rent receipts, bills for utility 
services, answering machine tapes, photographs, and 
other items which tends to prove ownership and/or 
control of the residence; 
which property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, 
and has been used to commit or conceal a public 
offense, and is being possessed with the purpose to use 
it as a means of committing or concealing a public 
offense, and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above 
is evidence of the crime of Distribution of Controlled 
Substances, to wit marijuana. Which is in violation of 
Section 58-37-8, U.C.A. as amended. 
WHEREFORE, the Affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued 
for the seizure of said items at any time day or night. It 
is further requested that the officers executing the 
requested warrant not be required to give notice of the 
officer's authority or purpose because: physical harm may 
result to any person if notice were given; or the property 
sought may quickly be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: Affiant's past 
experience and knowledge is that evidence can be quickly 
disposed of if our authority or purpose is announced. 
4 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff ] 
vs. ] 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON and ] 
SONNY GARCIA, ] 
Defendants ] 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
» CASE NO. 911000029 
> 910000028 
THIS MATTER IS before the Court upon joint Motion's by the 
Defendants for an order suppressing the evidence obtained as a 
result of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by 
the First Circuit Court Judge. The application for the warrant 
was supported by an affidavit of a police officer. 
The question before the Court is whether the issuing of 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there 
were enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable 
cause existed. Illinois vs. Gates, 462 U.S. ^ (1983), State 
vs. Brown, 798 P2 d, 284 (1990), and State vs. Collard, 59 Utah 
Advanced Reports 30 (1991). lit* pe< fH 'J-Hsty'<(*•• j 
The after-the-fact scrutiny by the District or Appellate 
Courts does not take the form of a de novo review, but rather 
reviewed with the circumstances in mind under which the 
magistrate issued the warrant with great deference given to the 
magistrate's determinations on probable cause. Gates supra. 
The affidavit in this case is not entirely dissimilar to 
that in the Gates case. Here, as there, anonymous information 
was received, a follow-up investigation ensued confirming and 
corroborating the facts alleged and the officers opinion was 
FILED 
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provided that the circumstances added up to drug trafficking. 
There is little question that under the older "two pronged" 
test enunciated in Spennille vs. United States, 393 U.S. 210, 
(1969) and Auoilar vs. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the 
affidavit is deficient. The "two pronged" test requires: 1. 
revealing of the the informant's "basis of knowledge" and 2. 
providing of sufficient facts to establish the informant's 
"veracity" or "reliability". Nothing in the affidavit reveals 
anything about either except that he or she is anonymous. Why 
anonymity, what relationship existed between the informant and 
the defendants, whether there was observation, involvement, or 
rumor or what ever that formed the basis of the knowledge is 
absent. Nor is any information furnished by the officer 
directly relating to the informant's "reliability or veracity". 
Under Augilar and Spennillie supra our inquiry would stop 
there, the affidavit would fail, and the evidence would be 
suppressed. Under the Gates rational, which has been embraced 
by the Utah Courts, (See Brown and Collard, Supra) the 
"totality of the circumstances" needs to be reviewed with 
respect to corroboration of the informant's tip by an 
independent police investigation. If the informant's tip is 
corroborated in "major part by efforts of police" then the 
magistrate is justified in relying upon said information. 
Courts often classify informants in two (2) categories, 
those who out of civic duty or the like inform police and those 
who are police confidential informants and who have a 
pecuniary, penal or some other self interest. The former are 
often given a limited presumption of credibility absent 
evidence of the contrary. Chambers vs. Marroni, 399 U.S. 46 
(1970). Here however, more information about the informant 
must be supplied than is found in the affidavit to warrant 
State of Utah vs. Anderson and Garcia 
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the presumption. If that information is lacking or the 
identity is otherwise unknown to the police officer, then as 
with the police confidential informant, the affidavit must make 
or demonstrate an account of reliability. Ordinarily the 
police should provide the basis of reliability by explaining 
why the informant is anonymous or confidential, showing past 
performance by the informant, admissions, against his penal 
interest or otherwise. 
Under Gates the Courts have now recognized that independent 
police investigation shown on the Affidavit can supply the 
basis for reliability otherwise absent. As to the "basis of 
knowledge", even though Gates held it unnecessary for the 
police officer to always make and set forth separate facts 
thereon, the Court still held that it is a "highly relevant" 
consideration. In this case no information was supplied in 
that regard. The affidavit recited that on the 29th day of 
January, 1991, an anonymous source stated that the Defendants 
were [are] transporting marijuana from Arizona into Utah and 
distributing it in Cache Valley and that they were [are] 
residing in the Days Inn Motel in Logan, Utah. 
The investigation confirmed the Defendants1 occupancy of 
the motel, their connection with Arizona, unusual living 
conditions, arrival and departure of persons consistent with 
drug trafficking, earlier drug involvement by Defendant 
Anderson, payment of rent bills by substantial sums of cash, 
and overall unusual activity such as living in a motel instead 
of an apartment or home despite local ties, including Defendant 
Anderson's own child and mother living only a few miles away. 
With all of this the police officer opined that with the 
combined 27 years of the affiant and the detective assisting 
him in the the investigation of drug offenses that the 
Defendants 
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were involved in drug trafficking. Obviously a magistrate 
cannot rely solely upon the conclusions of the affiant to 
establish probable cause, however, where the affiant has been 
shown to possess special knowledge or training the opinion may 
contribute to the finding of probable cause. 
Further, the information supplied by the anonymous 
confidential informant in this case, though not as specific and 
detailed as that found in Gates, nevertheless it is far more 
detailed than "casual rumor circulating in the underworld... 
or... a "general reputation". Spennille supra. 
Of major concern are the problems of freshness of the 
information and specificity of the dates and the resulting 
conclusion that the evidence would be found at the time of the 
search. In that regard the primary date of concern is that of 
January 29, 1991, when the anonymous tip was provided. The 
statement was that the defendants "are" (presently, we 
therefore presume) transporting and distributing the drugs in 
Cache Valley. The police check of the motel revealed that the 
Defendants had a habit of being "absent three-four days at a 
time" and that Defendant Garcia was away much of the month of 
February. The Defendant has made much of the fact that the 
letter discovered in Defendant Anderson's mother trash was 
written in November 1990, therefore stale by January 29, 1991, 
and hence fails to support the freshness requirement. 
Actually, the letter confirms the Arizona connection, the 
relationship between the Defendants, and the anticipated return 
to Utah, thereby corroborating the anonymous source on that 
information. The return of Defendant Garcia and the drug 
trafficking-like activity immediately after his return further 
confirms the source's information and provides further 
information as to the likelihood of evidence being found at the 
time and place of the search. 
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Here, as in Gates, the follow-up investigation did much to 
confirm the reported criminal conduct. The fact that most of 
the conduct observed did not reveal any "criminal mischief" or 
criminal activity is not critical. As under Gates it need only 
corroborate the tip made by the anonymous informant, thereby 
giving rise after review of the "totality of the circumstances" 
to present the issuing magistrate with a basis that "a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of the crime will be 
found in the particular place." From the above this Court is 
unable to establish that the magistrate did not have a 
substantial basis for his finding that probable cause existed. 
FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION 
On the day of , 1991, an evidentiary 
hearing was conducted to determine, among other things, the 
correctness of the information found on the affidavit. 
The defense argues that since only certain portions of the 
letter found in Defendant Andersons mother's trash were 
referred to, that the omissions, including the lack of the date 
thereof, were misleading. 
Ordinarily, when unsworn writings are referred to in the 
affidavit, copies thereof should be attached. Failing to do so 
however is not fatal, particularly whereas in this case the 
magistrate could easily assume that the letter was fairly 
recent as it was found in the Defendant's mother's trash. The 
fact that the letter was over two month old does not negate the 
value of the same corroborating the statement of the anonymous 
source as above discussed, nor is it detrimental to the 
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"freshness" issue. 
II. There is no question that the 1987 date as found in 
paragraph 3(e) on the affidavit was erroneous and should have 
been correctly typed 1977. The difference however is 
unimportant as the purpose was to show prior drug involvement. 
It would have been more meaningful to the magistrate with a 
1987 date rather than one ten years earlier, but that is only 
one factor in the overall consideration by the magistrate in 
determining the existence of probable cause. Nor does the fact 
that the cases against Defendant Anderson were dismissed in 
1977 and in 1983 constitute an omission. A complete criminal 
history and criminal litigation history was unnecessary as the 
fact of dismissal may or may not have aided in the suggestion 
that the Defendant had prior drug involvement. 
III. The claim that the magistrate was misled by the 
language in paragraph 3(b) relative to the $1,500.00 payment is 
without merit. The statement is ambiguous, but affidavits are 
normally drafted by non-lawyers in the mist of a criminal 
investigation. Gates supra. The ambiguity detracts in no 
fashion from the fact that the motel bills were large and paid 
in cash. Those are the salient points of the paragraph with 
the resulting implication as recited in paragraph 4, that such 
is not inconsistent with drug trafficking. 
NIGHT TIME SEARCH 
The defense has argued that the warrant is defective 
because it unjustifiably authorizes a night time search. A 
night time search, this Court agrees, was unjustified. The 
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evidentiary hearing revealed that the search took place in the 
day time. The issue is therefore moot. 
SUBPEONA DUCES TECUM 
The County Attorney, by stamped signature affixed by his 
secretary, issued a subpoena for certain information in the 
possession of the motel manager. The Court addressed the issue 
from the bench and here only confirms it by holding that: 1. 
the evidence was apparently obtained before the issuance of the 
subpoena; 2. that the subpoena was not obtained pursuant to 
Section 77-22-1, U.C.A., et. seq., but rather pursuant to Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; and 3. that 
obtaining the information did not violate Defendant's rights of 
privacy as argued by the defense. As to the standing argument 
the Court would find that the Defendant would have an 
expectation of privacy as well as that of Defendant Anderson, 
but that his right was not unconstitutionally violated by the 
police action. 
SCOPE OF THE SEARCH 
Defendant's have condemned the search (not the warrant) as 
being overly broad as items not described in the warrant were 
seized. Just what those are, if unjustified, can be properly 
excluded at the time of the trial. The Court cannot rule at 
this time with respect thereto. 
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VIDEO 
The Defendants have attacked the search as being "extremely 
intrusive" to the point that "it should shock the conscience of 
this Court", Though pertinent case authority in support of the 
Defendants' argument and with respect to these facts in this 
case is extremely light, the Court's review of the video can 
only result in a denial. Though Defendant Garcia was 
completely nude at one time in the video the offensive portion 
was of his own doing. Precautions were taken so that both he 
and Defendant Anderson could become modestly attired. 
Obviously, the single distasteful exposure though unnecessary 
does not vitiate the whole search. 
Overall, though the affidavit could have been more 
detailed, could have been more explicit, and a little less 
ambiguous, this Court finds that given the totality of the 
circumstances that the magistrate had a substantial basis for 
concluding that probable cause existed and that there was a 
fair probability that a controlled substance or evidence of a 
crime would be found at the place to be searched. 
Dated this 23rd day of December, 1991. ') 
BY THE COURT 
^^ " Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the forgoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid, to the 
attached list of sattorneys at the addresses set forth, 
this J24 day of jX(LC/>^/).f. i ^ . 1991, at LOGAN, UTAH. 
Sharon L. Hancey 
DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
